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SELLING THE PAYMENTS: PREDATORY
LENDING GOES PRIMETIME
DUSTIN FISHER*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The historical resentment of lenders is best captured in the
popular saying that "a banker is a fellow who lends you his
umbrella when the sun is shining and wants it back the minute it
begins to rain."1 Frustration and distrust of lenders developed
prior to the Great Depression, an era of almost no federal
The home lending market thrived on so-called
regulation.!
nontraditional loans, which were not fully amortizing and
Following the economic
generally required unique financing.'
trauma of the Great Depression, the federal government promoted
a stable lending environment based on the traditional fixed-rate
thirty-year mortgage.4
However, the traditional mortgage was a luxury often limited
to borrowers with higher credit scores. Although nontraditional
loans continued to have a presence in the prime credit market,
they quickly became the province of the subprime market.5

* J.D. Candidate, May 2008, The John Marshall Law School. I would like
to thank Kimberly, Griffin and Zoe Fisher for their sacrifice, support, and
daily inspiration. I would also like to thank the Fisher and Spahr families for
being my foundation and always believing in my ability. Without each of you,
this journey would not have been possible.
1. Many attribute this witticism to Mark Twain. Thinkexist.com, Mark
Twain Quotes, http://en.thinkexist.comlquotation/a_banker is a fellowwho_
lends-you_ hisumbrella/179029.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2008).
2. See Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime "HEL" was Paved
with Good Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime
Home Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473, 477-81 (2000) (identifying the
Federal Home Loan Bank Act, The Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, and The
National Housing Act of 1934 as the first attempts at regulating the lending
industry since the adoption of the National Bank Act in 1864).
3. See Fred Wright, Comment, The Effect of New Deal Real Estate
Residential Finance and ForeclosurePolicies Made in Response to the Real
Estate Conditions of the Great Depression, 57 ALA. L. REV. 231, 232-38 (2005)
(providing an overview of the lending practices prior to the Great Depression).
4. Michael S. Knoll, Taxation, Negative Amortization and Affordable
Mortgages, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1341, 1343-44 (1992).
5. Subprime borrowers are those who have "FICO" credit scores below 620.
DAVID A. SCHMUDDE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MORTGAGES AND LIENS 90 (ALI-
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Initially, the abuses known as predatory lending focused within
this lower market, causing many to associate one with the other.6
This Comment, in contrast, focuses on the predatory lending
practices that have taken the prime credit market by surprise.
Part II begins with a background of the prime mortgage
environment and its evolution from traditional to nontraditional
loans. In addition, Part II discusses the definition of predatory
lending and its expansion into the prime credit market. Part III
follows with examples of loans that are likely to entice prime
borrowers into predatory lending schemes. One of the principal
distinctions between the prime and subprime market is that their
loans typically serve very different purposes for each type of
borrower. Therefore, Part III differentiates between prime and
subprime borrowers and the ways in which their loans are being
abused.
Part IV proposes a practical and simple solution to curb prime
predatory lending, and reinforces the importance of stability
through the use of traditional financing.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

The Mortgage Process

Prior to obtaining a mortgage, a potential borrower must fill
out an application allowing the lender to examine his past and
present financial situation.7 Although credit scoring models vary,
ABA 2004). A FICO score, named after its developers, Fair, Isaac and
Company, Inc. (now known as the Fair Isaac Corporation), grades borrowers
on a range of creditworthiness from 300-900 with higher numbers
representing a lower risk of default. Id. at 65.
6. Few law review articles describe the nature of predatory lending in the
prime credit market. See, e.g., Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale
of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 1255, 1261 (2002) (noting that "[wihile the definition of predatory loans
is not restricted to the subprime market, that is where predatory loans are
most prevalent[;] [aiccordingly, predatory loans in the subprime market are
the focus of our analysis"); Margot Saunders, The Increase in Predatory
Lending and Appropriate Remedial Actions, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 111, 112
(2002) (identifying those without access to mainstream credit as the target of
abusive lending practices); Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., Effecting Responsibility in the
Mortgage Broker-Borrower Relationship: A Role for Agency Principles in
PredatoryLending Regulation, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1471, 1475 (2005) (arguing
that the likely targets of predatory lending efforts are those who have
"significant educational, experiential, and financial disadvantage[s]"); Debra
Pogrund Stark, Unmasking the Predatory Loan in Sheep's Clothing: A
Legislative Proposal, 21 HARv. BLACKLEITrER L.J. 129, 133 (2005) (linking the

rise in predatory loans with the increase in subprime mortgages over the last
decade).
7. SCHMUDDE, supra note 5, at 64. Typically, the lender will require past
tax returns, verification of present income, and a copy of the contract for the
pending home sale. Id.
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the prime borrower generally will have a FICO score equal to or
greater than 620.8 Next, the lender will consider the property's
appraisal value9 and weigh these factors in light of each other to
assess the borrower's risk of default.
After conducting a risk assessment, the lender will devise a
future monthly mortgage payment (plus property taxes) that falls
within 25%-29% of the borrower's gross monthly income. 0 The
lender should also ensure that the borrower's total debt obligation
does not exceed 41% of his monthly income." Herein lies the

8. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Fair Isaac Corporation
considers the following factors in calculating FICO scores: payment history
(35%), amounts owed (30%), length of credit history (15%), new credit (10%),
What's In Your FICO Score,
and types of credit used (10%).
http://www.myfico.com/CreditEducation/WhatsInYourScore.aspx (last visited
Jan. 19, 2008). Borrowers with a FICO score under 620 can still qualify for a
prime credit loan if they have a greater amount of equity to secure the
mortgage. See SCHMUDDE, supra note 5, at 65 (identifying the default rate of
homeowners who have at least 30% equity in the home as less than one-fourth
of 1%).
9. Id. at 64-65. The home appraisal process is underrepresented in
predatory lending literature despite its significant influence on the problem.
The purpose of home appraisals is to determine the fair market value of a
home in order to protect the lender from any potential default by the borrower.
While this appears to be a rather basic proposition, it is usually more complex.
For example, how does an appraiser adequately determine the true value of a
home in a rapidly appreciating real estate environment?
Appraisers traditionally use three methods of assessing a home's value: the
"comparable-sales method," the "capitalization-of-income method," and the
"reproduction-cost-new-less-depreciation method." Robin Paul Malloy, Lender
Liability for Negligent Real Estate Appraisals, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 53, 55-57
(1984). The comparable-sales method, which determines a property's value
based on the recent sale prices of similar residential properties, is by far the
most prevalent method of evaluating the residential market. Id. However,
the comparable-sales method is based on an assumption that comparable
properties exist. Id. at 56. If home prices are appreciating or depreciating
abnormally, the comparable-sales method is compromised by viewing present
value through varying circumstances.
Further, appraisals are often the final step in home financing causing
appraisers to frequently face significant pressure to come in at a particular
number that the buyer, seller, and lender have already agreed upon. In
theory, the lender wants to protect itself from future default, but the reality is
that the lender knows its loans can be bundled and sold with others. See Kurt
Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: PredatoryLending, Securitization, and the
Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 550-54 (2002)
(explaining how after securitization became the driving force in the lending
market, underwriting became less of a concern and a significant part of the
foreclosure risk shifted to the purchaser). As lenders rarely hold onto the
mortgage for the life of the loan, their business model is based on volume
instead. In other words, writing a large number of loans helps to cushion any
risk of default.
10. SCHMUDDE, supra note 5,at 65.
11. Id. Total debt includes credit card payments, past loans, or any other
debt obligations.
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initial problem: if the lender chooses to disregard total debt
obligation, he can use the allure of lower rates to induce the
borrower into making larger principal payments to "afford" a more
expensive home. 2
The conservative nature of American borrowers combined
with a relatively stable housing market has historically prevented
this problem. Following the Great Depression, an overwhelming
majority of prime mortgage loans had fixed-rate terms. 13 Fixedrate loans are widely considered to be the least risky because the
borrower has cost certainty until the loan is fully amortized." For
this reason, many people assumed that prime credit borrowers
who used nontraditional loans did so based on specific need only."
B. Stability Versus Assumption of Risk
There is no particular reason why American borrowers prefer
the thirty-year fixed-rate loan; this certainly is not the case in
other parts of the world. 6 Indeed, confused by the conundrum,
none other than Alan Greenspan openly wondered why more
Americans were not using adjustable rate mortgages ("ARMs")."
Although Greenspan cautioned against using ARMs in a rising

12. A basic example clarifies the point. A $100,000 loan amortized over
thirty years at an 8% interest rate has a monthly payment of $733.36. That
same loan with a 6% interest rate has a monthly payment of $599.95. By
taking the borrower's total debt obligations out of the equation, the 8%
interest rate requires a total gross monthly income of $2933.44, while the 6%
interest rate only requires $2399.80.
13. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE

12-13 (2d ed.,

Princeton Univ. Press 2005) (2001) (noting that appreciation of homes has
been a "rocket taking off," as only the post-World War II boom can rival the
home appreciation of 52% between 1997-2004). Also, unlike the post-World
War II boom, the more recent boom was not accompanied by a corresponding
increase in income. Id.
14. See SCHMUDDE, supra note 5, at 76 (identifying one of the most
beneficial aspects of the fixed-rate mortgage as allowing the borrower to know
the exact dollar amount of the monthly payment for the life of the loan).
15. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 6, at 1284 (recognizing that although
nontraditional loans are available to prime credit borrowers, such loans are
discretionary alternatives to the more predictable "fixed-rate variety").
16. See Benny L. Kass, Greenspan, ARMs and What's Best for You, WASH.
POST, Mar. 6, 2004, at F03 (quoting Alan Greenspan, "[tihis preference is in
striking contrast to the situation in some other countries, where adjustablerate mortgages are far more common and where efforts to introduce Americantype fixed-rate mortgages generally have not been successful[;] [flixed-rate
mortgages seem unduly expensive to households in other countries").
17. Id. "Recent research within the Federal Reserve suggests that many
homeowners might have saved tens of thousands of dollars had they held
adjustable-rate mortgages rather than fixed-rate mortgages during the past
decade .... " Id.
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interest rate environment,"' the lending industry conveniently
highlighted this part of his speech:
American consumers might benefit if lenders provided
greater mortgage product alternatives to the traditional
fixed-rate mortgage. To the degree that households are
driven by fears of payment shocks but are willing to manage
their own interest rate risks, the traditional fixed-rate
mortgage may be an expensive method of financing a home.19
While Greenspan did not suggest ARMs were proper for all
prime borrowers, his immense credibility allowed lenders to use
this statement as an endorsement for nontraditional loans.29
However, Greenspan made these remarks at a time when the
thirty-year fixed-rate loan approached historically low interest
rates.2'
With the market and history favoring thirty-year fixed-rate
loans, common sense weighed against borrowers changing course.
Unfortunately, borrowing practices changed as ARMs represented
33% of all U.S. loan applications in 2004 and 34% in 2005.22
Moreover, 43% of all first time home buyers in 2005 put "no money
down" on their mortgages. 3 At least 15% of these 2005 buyers are
now "upside-down" on their mortgages, meaning that they owe
more than the purchase price of the home. 4 Perhaps even more
shocking is that 12.3% of all loans written during the first five

18. See id. (stating that homeowners might not have saved thousands "had
interest rates trended sharply upward").
19. Id.
20. While there were certainly editorials and articles to the contrary, the
following headlines from a variety of newspapers prove how lenders could use
this statement as a selling point: Eileen Alt Powell, Momentum Starts to Build
for Adjustable Mortgages; Fed Chairman Says That Traditional, Fixed-Rate
Loans Caused Some People to Pay 'Tens of Thousands' More During the Past
Decade, TELEGRAPH HERALD, Mar. 14, 2004, at B2; Paul Gores, Maybe You
Really Need an ARM; Adjustable-Rate Mortgages Can Offer Buyers the Muscle
They Need to Land a House, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 20, 2004, at 01D;
Lew Sichelman, ARMs Are Not Heretical,If You Can Manage Risk, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 21, 2004, at 5B.
21. Greenspan delivered this particular speech on February 23, 2004.
Kass, supra note 16. During that time period, the average commitment rates
for thirty-year fixed-rate mortgages dropped under 6% for the first time since
at least 1971. Freddie Mac, 30-Year Fixed-Rate Mortgages Since 1971,
http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmms30.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2008).
22. Freddie Mac, Freddie Mac Releases Results of Its 22nd Annual ARM
Survey,http://www.freddiemac.com/news/archives/rates/2006/20060105_O5arm
survey.html [hereinafter Freddie Mac 1] (last visited Jan. 19, 2008).
23. Lon Witter, The No-Money-Down Disaster,BARRON'S, Aug. 21, 2006, at
33, available at TPM Cafe, http://www.tpmcafe.com/blog/moonlore2000200l/
2006/aug/23/the no-moneyAown-disaster (Aug. 23, 2006, 12:04 EST).
24. See id. (noting that "15.2% of 2005 buyers owe at least 10% more than
their home is worth").
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months of 2006 were option ARMs, in which over 80% of
borrowers have failed to pay enough to cover the interest due each
month.26
Although this Comment does not attempt to answer the
housing market's version of the chicken and the egg question
(which came first, increased use of nontraditional loans or
unprecedented price appreciation in the housing market?), the
impact of rising home costs cannot be ignored. Robert Shiller, a
Yale economist, charted home price appreciation since 1890 with
staggering results.
If the median home value in 1890 was
$100,000 (adjusted for inflation), the comparable home in 2003
was valued in excess of $199,000.27
Under Schiller's analysis,
homes are overvalued at unprecedented levels.28 This relates to
the lending market in two ways. First, nontraditional financing
allows buyers to qualify for homes they otherwise could not afford
under traditional fixed guidelines.
Second, nontraditional
financing provides a windfall of equity to previous homeowners,
which lenders have capitalized on through the encouragement of
home equity withdrawal.
While the value of a home is usually linked to income and
rental prices, neither factor has appreciated anywhere near the
rate of homes. 29 The lending industry used to hedge against
25. Mara Der Hovanesian, Nightmare Mortgages, Bus. WK., Sept. 11, 2006,
at 70. The number of option ARMs written in 2003 accounted for only 0.5% of
all mortgages. Id.
26. See id. (identifying negative amortization as the largest problem with
option ARMs, a process in which each month's unpaid interest is tacked on to
the principal).
27. SHILLER, supra note 13, at 3.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, New Census Bureau Data
Highlight Changes in Housing Values Through 2005 (Oct. 3, 2006) (on file
with the U.S. Census Bureau), available at http://www.census.gov/PressRelease/www/releases/archives/americancommunity-survey-acs/007577.html
[hereinafter Housing Values PressRelease] (reporting increases in real median
home values across the country). The Census Bureau's data shows the
magnitude of the problem. Home values, in real terms, have increased
nationwide by 32% since 2000. Id. Coastal cities have been hit the hardest,
especially San Diego. Id. Between 2000 and 2005, the median home price in
San Diego increased from $249,000 to $567,000 (a shocking 127.2% increase).
Id. In addition, real median homeownership costs shot up 5% over the same
five year period, with some of the highest increases in Midwestern cities such
as Detroit (24.1%) and Chicago (21.7%). Id. The Census data further suggest
that from 2000 to 2005, the cost of renting a home has increased nationally by
6.7%. Id. So the question arises, have economic fundamentals supported this
dramatic rise in home values? The Census Bureau seems to answer in the
negative. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Income Climbs, Poverty
Stabilizes, Uninsured Rate Increases (Aug. 29, 2006) (on file with the U.S.
Census Bureau), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/
releases/archives/incomewealth/007419.html
[hereinafter Income Climbs
Press Release] (noting that real median income increased 1.1% between 2004
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inflation of housing prices by using independent appraisals. °
However, rapid home appreciation combined with a seemingly
insatiable demand for homes has created an atmosphere in which
independent appraisers are asked to ignore fundamentals and
"come in"at a particular number or risk losing future business.3
As mentioned above, predatory lending is a problem facing
society's most vulnerable borrowers.32 Those borrowers who are
capable of qualifying for prime credit should be immune from
predatory lending due to their perceived economic sophistication.33
Yet, as prime borrowers continue to throw away the security
blanket of fixed-rate loans and assume the inherent risks of
ARMs, predatory lenders are moving into the prime credit market
like never before.
C. Difficulties of Definition:What Is PredatoryLending?

Predatory lending has always been easier to identify than to
define.34 In the absence of outright fraud, the loans are those
and 2005, making it the "first year since 1999 in which real median household
income showed an annual increase"). Also, "the nation's official poverty rate
remained statistically unchanged at 12.6 percent" and "[tihe percentage of
people without health insurance coverage rose from 15.6 percent to 15.9
percent." Id.
30. See Malloy, supra note 9, at 55-60 (describing the different appraisal
methods).
31. See, e.g., Larry Finley, Bloated Home Prices: Complaints Against
Illinois Appraisers on the Rise, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 13, 2006, at El
(describing the growing number of complaints regarding fraudulent home
appraisals). Ron De Vries, a past board member of the Appraisal Institute,
stated that some lenders threaten to take their business elsewhere if the
appraiser does not reach a particular estimate. See id. (quoting De Vries,
"[t]hey get a call one day, and the lender says if you don't raise the value on
this appraisal I'm never going to give you another assignment"). Sometimes,
the lender will call and say, "I want you to do an appraisal, and the property
value has to be at least $200,000. Will you do it?" Id.
32. See Stark, supra note 6, at 134 (identifying the usual victims of
predatory lending as "the elderly or minorities").
33. However, this belief is not supported by the data. See William R.
Emmons, Consumer-FinanceMyths and Other Obstacles to FinancialLiteracy,
24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 335, 336-39 (2005) (explaining how "evidence
suggests that even basic financial literacy is by no means common among U.S.
households").
34. Former Senator Phil Gramm "famously asserted that predatory lending
could not be addressed until it could be defined." Engel & McCoy, supra note
6, at 1259. The federal government has attempted to define predatory lending
as "engaging in deception or fraud, manipulating the borrower through
aggressive sales tactics, or taking unfair advantage of a borrower's lack of
understanding about loan terms. These practices are often combined with
loan terms that, alone or in combination, are abusive or make the borrower
more vulnerable to abusive practices." See Eggert, supra note 9, at 511
(quoting U.S. DEP'T OF HOuS. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY,
HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING 1 (2001), available at

http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelfl2/pressrel/treasrpt.pdf).
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which are simply inappropriate for that particular borrower, or35
stated differently something a reasonable borrower would avoid.
Further, the lending practices originally identified as "predatory"
have evolved over time and certainly are no longer limited to a
particular market.36
Despite these ambiguities, a number of predatory practices
have earned a name for themselves. First and foremost, there are
techniques known as "equity stripping 37 or "asset based lending,"38
in which lenders extend loans with little expectation that the
borrowers will be able to repay them. By ignoring the borrower's
income and total amount of debt, the lender can make a quick deal
and then securitize and sell the loan on the secondary market.4 °
to define predatory lending by identifying a variety of its common practices.
See Engel & McCoy, supra note 6, at 1260 (defining predatory lending as a
"syndrome" involving one or more of the following five problems: "(1) loans
structured to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to borrowers, (2)
harmful rent seeking, (3) loans involving fraud or deceptive practices, (4) other
forms of lack of transparency in loans that are not actionable as fraud, and (5)
loans that require borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress").
However, some believe that the issue of defining predatory lending has
received too much attention. See Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and
PredatoryLending: Unmasking the DeregulatoryAgenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1,
12-13 (2005) (arguing that the "definition of predatory lending has been the
subject of more debate than it deserves" and that "at its heart [predatory
lending] is nothing more than misappropriation of income or equity by
financial subterfuge"); Engel & McCoy, supra note 6, at 1260 (remarking that
activists believe "you know predatory lending when you see it").
35. See Stark, supra note 6, at 134 (noting that that predatory loans are
simply "bad loans").
36. For example, the most dominant image in predatory lending literature
is that of excessive fees and interest rates. See Eggert, supra note 9, at 514
(describing that it is common for predatory lenders to "charge fees and interest
rates far greater than necessary to provide a reasonable, market-driven rate of
return to the lender given the risk of lending to the particular borrower"). The
prime credit market faces the opposite problem of lenders using unreasonably
low rates as an inducement to enter into bad loans.
37. Eggert, supra note 9, at 515.
38. Engel & McCoy, supra note 6, at 1262.
39. Eggert, supra note 9, at 515.
40. Id. The securitization process has been credited with revolutionizing
the lending industry, breaking down the process so that the lender is no longer
solely responsible for all the functions of the loan. Id. at 552. Now the loan
can be originated, funded, securitized, bought and serviced all by different
entities, allowing each to deny responsibility for the others' actions. Id.
Mortgage brokers who originate the loan often have an incentive to push
borrowers into larger and/or subprime loans in order to maximize commissions
received from lenders. Id. at 553-54. Likewise, lenders may choose to then
deceive secondary market purchasers about a borrower's true credit risks to
forego dealing with the impending default. Engel & McCoy, supra note 6, at
1286-87. Brokers and lenders have little incentive to act otherwise when they
do not bear the risk of loss. Id.
ARMs with artificially low introductory rates are particularly an issue
because the risk of default is low during the initial "teaser" period. Thus,
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Meanwhile, the borrower is likely to face bankruptcy or
foreclosure.
Another predatory practice moving into the prime credit
market is "loan flipping."41 Lenders engage in loan flipping when
they persuade a struggling borrower to frequently refinance his
loan while tacking on prepayment penalties, points and fees each
time.42 Although the borrower receives temporary relief in the
form of lower payments, he will eventually owe the lender a higher
total principal and interest amount." Lenders frequently use this
concept as a selling point for ARMs, easing borrower anxiety with
assurances that if the rates go up, "we'll just refinance.""
Finally, the most notorious predatory lending practices that
have found their way to prime credit borrowers are prepayment
While either practice is
penalties and balloon payments.45
damaging enough independently, lenders often combine both with
devastating results.46 Surprisingly, prepayment penalties and
lenders are protected from litigation until the teaser period ends, at which
point the secondary purchaser may not have a claim against the lender.
Although secondary purchasers can take measures to protect themselves to
some extent, none of the solutions seem to effectively deter the predatory
cycle. See id. at 1288-89 (discussing how the lenders can declare bankruptcy,
"tuck predatory loans in with bundles of good loans," or take further measures
to harm borrowers under recourse provisions).
41. Id. at 1263.
42. Eggert, supra note 9, at 515-16.
43. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 6, at 1263 (noting that loan flipping
often results in "equity stripping" because the borrower's home equity declines
with each refinance).
44. Predatory lenders used this disingenuous sales pitch for variable rate
mortgages at a time of historically low fixed rates. Informed borrowers
recognized the inevitable truth that the possibility of rising interest rates was
a matter of "when" and not "if." Less educated borrowers, however, were
easier to exploit through the belief that a new paradigm existed in the real
estate market.
45. Prepayment penalties are imposed on a borrower when she repays the
entire loan balance prior to reaching its full-term. See generally Eggert, supra
note 9, at 518-19 (explaining that such penalties were originally designed to
prevent prepayment, which results in the lender receiving less interest than
he bargained for; however, predatory lenders use prepayment penalties to
"trap the borrower ... or to reward the lender with an unreasonable payoff').
For the purposes of this Comment, prepayment penalties are typically found
in teaser loans, such as the 2/28 loan, that initially have artificially low
interest rates and then readjust after a certain time period to reflect the lost
interest rate income. See infra Part III.A (analyzing the way in which "teaser"
loans attract borrowers).
Conversely, balloon payments force borrowers to repay the entire
remaining balance of the loan after a certain number of years, rather than
continue to pay monthly payments for the duration of the loan. Eggert, supra
note 9, at 519-20. Balloon payments are common in negative amortization
loans and are particularly an issue in option ARMs. See supra Part III.C.
46. See generally Hovanesian, supra note 25, at 70 (describing how the use
of these and other predatory lending tactics are breaking homeowners across
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balloon payments continue to gain in popularity.47 Overall, as
home prices continue to appreciate to unprecedented levels, prime
borrowers have proven to be less sophisticated and equally
susceptible to these and other predatory lending practices.
III. ANALYSIS
Those debating over predatory lending in the subprime
market have always struggled with the fundamental issues
involved. For example, why do people take out such unfavorable
loans?
Will regulation have the counterproductive effect of
making all loans less available to the subprime market?48
To a certain extent, the answers are straightforward.
Subprime borrowers take out unfavorable loans because they are
available when more favorable loans are not.49
Without
nontraditional loans, subprime borrowers are often denied the
popular American dream of owning their own home. ° Thus,
the country). An anecdotal story describes the situation:
Jennifer and Eric Hinz of Somerset, Wis., are feeling the squeeze. They
refinanced out of a 5.25% fixed-rate, 30-year loan in June, 2005, and
into an option ARM with a 1% teaser rate from Indymac Bank. The
$1,483 payment for their original mortgage dropped to as low as $747
with the new option ARM. They say they had no idea when they signed
up, however, that the low payment adds $600 in deferred interest to
their balance every month. Worse, they thought the 1% would last three
years, but they're already paying 7.68%. "What reasonable human
being would ever knowingly give up a 5.25% fixed-rate for what we're
getting now?" says Eric, 36, who works in commercial construction.
Refinancing is out because they can't afford the $15,000 or so in fees.
Id.
47. See generally id. (noting that "despite the housing slump, option ARMs
totaling $77.2 billion were written in the second quarter of [2006]"). Further,
such predatory loans are not limited to the coastal areas facing astronomical
appreciation. In 2006, option ARMs comprised 51% of all loans in West
Virginia and 26% in Wyoming. Id. Further, LoanPerformance LLC, a San
Francisco real estate information service, found that interest-only mortgages
made up 45.5% of all loans written in Atlanta and 43.4% of loans in Denver
during 2004. Peter Coy, The Home Loans Vexing Greenspan, BUS. WK., June
10, 2005, available at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jun2005/
nf20050610_5662_db016.htm.
48. See Mary Wisniewski, Loan Shock: Mortgage Pros FearNew State Regs
Will Hurt Business, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Sept. 11, 2006, at 53 (discussing the
debate over HB 4050, Illinois' new anti-predatory lending law that requires
borrowers under a certain credit score to obtain financial counseling before
entering into a loan with a broker; opponents worry that the law "might make
credit unavailable [to certain] areas"); see also Engel & McCoy, supra note 6,
at 1257-58 (providing a brief summary of the "fierce debate" over how to
resolve the predatory lending problem).
49. See id. at 1279 (identifying the subprime market as a place where those
with "elevated risk levels" can "take advantage of the influx of mortgage
capital and flexible... loan products").
50. See id. at 1261 (noting that lenders have eased numerous underwriting
standards in the subprime market to enable those borrowers to purchase a
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predatory lending literature and regulation must grapple with
criticizing the only parties extending credit to the subprime
community.
This Comment is not attempting to combat the problem of
predatory lending in the subprime market. Indeed, the problems
highlighted above are happening in both the prime and subprime
market. However, the evolution of predatory lending in the prime
credit market is unique. Instead of "tightening" credit, where
borrowers are faced with unfavorable loan terms or not getting a
home, lenders combine the perfect storm of rising home costs and
"loosening" credit to induce prime credit borrowers into equally
unfavorable loans.
In theory, prime credit borrowers should have greater
flexibility in obtaining financing.51 Additionally, the ability to
qualify at historically low fixed interest rates should have
protected prime borrowers from predatory lending practices. As
home prices began to appreciate faster than income,52 however,
prime borrowers became more willing to assume risk to purchase
homes.' This opens the door to predatory lenders and allows them
to do what the car industry has done for decades: sell the
payments, not the price.5
A. The Allure of Low Payments: The "Teaser Loan"
There is perhaps no better demonstration of "selling the
payments" than the teaser loans advertised on the television,
radio, newspaper, and the Internet. The concept behind teaser
loans is quite simple. For a temporary period of time, the
borrower has an extremely low monthly payment through either
an artificially low interest rate or by neglecting to pay any

home).
51. See id. at 1284 (describing lending conditions in the prime market
where borrowers can obtain easy to understand fixed-rate loans, or choose to
use a nontraditional loan alternative).

52. Housing Values PressRelease, supra note 29.
53. Freddie Mac 1, supra note 22.
54. "Sell the payments, not the price" is a phrase most commonly associated
with car sales.
See generally Automotive.com, Car Buying Basics,

http://www.automotive.com/new-cars/36/car-buying-tips/car-buying-tip
basics.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2008) (describing car dealer tactics and how
to avoid paying too much for a car); SUPERNOVA SELLING SYSTEMS, SHOW ME
THE MONEY! (2003), http'/www.serviceroundtable.com/freebies/viewfreebie.
asp?PCID=296 (last visited Mar. 11, 2008) (explaining how salespeople
achieve success through financing plans).
In essence, a salesperson
determines how much a buyer can pay per month on a vehicle and then uses
that price point to sell a more attractive, and more expensive, vehicle. By
playing with interest rates and loan terms, the salesperson can achieve a
greater commission for herself and send larger profits to the dealership and
manufacturer.
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principal.55 After the initial "teaser" period, the payments readjust
to reflect a higher interest rate56 or a shorter term to pay off the
remaining principal.57
Two notorious teaser loans are the "2/28" loan and the
"interest-only" loan. With respect to 2/28 loans, the number "2"
reflects the period of under-market interest and the number "28"
refers to the years remaining on the loan term. For example, a
borrower takes out a $200,000 2/28 loan with an initial teaser rate
of 4.5%. For the first two years of the loan, the borrower's monthly
payment will be $1,013. At the end of the two-year period, the
interest rate readjusts to the contracted market rate, which can
increase payments by as much as 25%."
Originally, subprime borrowers agreed to 2/28 loans as
instruments to "rebuild" credit. Lenders convinced borrowers that
they could establish better credit by making prompt payments at a
low rate59 and then refinancing at a "prime" rate after the two-year
55. The teaser loan term varies from a few months to the most popular twoyear term.
See generally Calculated Risk: Assessing Non-Traditional
Mortgage Products: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, Subcomm. on Housing and Transportation,and Subcomm. on
Economic Policy, 109th Cong. 5-7 (2006) [hereinafter Calculated Risk]
(statement of Michael D. Calhoun, President, Center for Responsible Lending),
available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/Testimony-Calhoun 092
006.pdf (referring to two-year teaser loans as "exploding ARMs"). While the
focus of Calhoun's testimony is directed on the subprime market, he notes that
one out of five recent subprime borrowers could have qualified for a traditional
prime market loan. Id. at 3 (citing Mark Hudson & E. Scott Reckard, The
Nation; More Homeowners With Good Credit Getting Stuck With Higher-Rate
Loans, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005, at Al).
56. See CalculatedRisk, supra note 55, at 6 (indicating that a 2% increase
in the market index at the end of a teaser period would be a "conservative
assumption[]").
57. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
INTEREST-ONLY MORTGAGE PAYMENTS AND PAYMENT-OPTION ARMS 2 (2006),

available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/mortgage-interestonly/mort
gage interestonly.pdf [hereinafter Board of Governors] (remarking that the
"[interest-only] payment period is typically between 3 and 10 years"). The
Federal Reserve further stated:
After that, your monthly payment will increase - even if interest rates
stay the same - because you must pay back the principal as well as the
interest. For example, if you take out a 30-year mortgage loan with a 5year 1-0 payment period, you can pay only interest for 5 years and then
both principal and interest over the next 25 years. Because you begin to
pay back the principal, your payments increase after year 5.
Id.
58. Notably, this figure was reached by applying Mr. Calhoun's
"conservative" market rate increase of 2%. CalculatedRisk, supra note 55, at
6. For example, after the ARM adjusts, a 4.5% interest rate payment of $1013
per month would increase to a 6.5% interest rate payment of $1254 per month
for the lifetime of the loan. Vikas Bajaj & Ron Nixon, Variable Loans Help to
Put Off Mortgage Pain, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2006, at Al.
59. See Mortgage-X, http://mortgage-x.com/library/2_28_loan.asp
(last
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term. Borrowers could thereby reestablish their credit rating and
achieve a prime credit loan with more favorable terms.
However, 2/28 loans have not been limited to the subprime
market.' Instead, prime borrowers have used the 2/28 loan to
qualify for homes they could not afford under traditional
financing.61 As described above, qualification for a mortgage
depends on the mortgage payment versus income and debt, not on
the total cost of a home.62 Therefore, if a prime borrower is willing
to assume the risks of a 2/28 loan, she too can qualify for a home
based on an artificially low payment.
Interest-only loans take the desire for low monthly payments
to the next level. With this type of loan, the borrower initially is
required to pay only the interest that accrues each month.63 For
example, a $200,000 loan with a 6.5% interest rate would yield a
monthly payment of $1,083 during the interest-only period.
However, at the conclusion of the interest-only period, the
borrower's monthly payment will include interest plus principal
payments that fully amortize the loan.'
This will, almost
visited Jan. 19, 2008) (stating that 2/28 loans "allow [borrowers] two years to
rebuild [their] credit, at which point [they] may refinance at a better rate");
Loan Programs, http://www.bancasa.net/loan-programs.HTM (last visited Jan.
19, 2008) (describing that the 2/28's "purpose is to offer temporary financing to
these applicants until they can qualify for [prime] financing"); Advantix
Lending, 2/28 ARM Mortgage Loan, http://www.advantixlending.con
eliminate debtarm-loan.asp?loantype=3 (last visited Jan. 19, 2008)
(advertising the 2/28 as an instrument that allows the borrower two years to
"rebuild [her] credit, at which point [she] may refinance at a better rate").
60. CalculatedRisk, supra note 55, at 3 (noting that 20% of the subprime
mortgages in 2006 were actually borrowed by people who could have qualfied
for a prime credit loan).
61. See FDIC, Breaking New Ground in U.S. Mortgage Lending,
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/regional/ro20062q/na/2006_summer04.
html [hereinafter FDIC] (last visited Jan. 30, 2008) (noting that borrowers
have used nontraditional mortgage products "to stretch home-buying power").
62. See SCHMUDDE, supra note 5, at 65 (stating that lenders usually qualify
borrowers for mortgages that have monthly payments no greater than 25-29%
of the borrowers' gross monthly income, and that will not cause the borrowers'
total monthly debt to exceed 41% of their total monthly income). For example,
a $200,000 loan with a 4.5% teaser rate would require an income of
approximately $43,000 to qualify. By contrast, a borrower must have a yearly
income of approximately $54,000 to qualify for a 6.5% interest rate on the
same loan. In other words, teaser loans allow a borrower with approximately
25% less income to qualify for a similar home. Further, the larger the loan,
the larger the spread in real dollars.
63. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS, supra note 57, at 2-3 (stating that interestonly mortgage payments, unlike traditional mortgage payments, do not
decrease the principal balance).
64. The monthly payment on the fully amortized loan will be approximately
$1264. Thus, the interest-only loan functions vary much like a teaser rate
loan in that it allows a borrower to defer principal payments during the
interest-only period (typically 3-10 years) in exchange for a lower monthly
payment. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS, supra note 57, at 2-4 (comparing

The John Marshall Law Review

[41:587

66

certainly,65 increase monthly payments.
Interest-only loans often attract prime borrowers who are
willing to "gamble" that they will have a substantial increase in
income or equity during the teaser period.67 Borrowers who fear
they will be "priced out" agree to a loan with hopes that their
future gain will justify the overall expense of the home.68 This
rationale is particularly interesting because it is similar to the
sales pitch given to subprime borrowers.69
While subprime
borrowers are sold on the hope that they can repair credit and
qualify for a lower fixed interest rate loan, prime borrowers are
sold on the suggestion that their income (or rapid home
appreciation) will grow and allow them to comfortably make
payments down the road.
B. No Income Documentation,No Problem
Borrowers, lenders, and investors have always relied on a
borrower's income to act as a protective shield in the lending
industry. ° A borrower who qualifies for a prime credit loan is
deemed to be a relatively safe investment in a properly appraised
home,71 as job loss is the only major risk. 2 Due to this sense of
interest-only loans with payment-option ARMs).
65. The major exception to this outcome is the few borrowers capable of
making principal payments on top of the initial interest-only charges. Indeed,
interest-only loans were originally designed for wealthier borrowers who
received their earnings in irregular lumps, allowing them to pay principal
during the months in which they received a greater amount of income. See
Holden Lewis, Who Should Get an Interest-Only Mortgage?, BANKRATE,
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mtg/20020620b.asp (last visited Jan. 30,
2008) (identifying the typical candidate for an interest-only mortgage as "an
executive who earns a moderate salary and whose main income is from
bonuses once or twice a year," but advising that such loans are not
recommended for "regular wage earners").
66. The amount of the payment increase is determined by the length of the
interest-only term. Using the $200,000 loan example, a five-year interest-only
period would result in a monthly payment of $1350 after five years.
67. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS, supra note 57, at 7 (listing one reason for
taking out an interest-only loan as being "reasonably certain" that income will
increase in the future). Home appreciation is another common gamble with
interest-only loans. The borrower gambles that the home's appreciation over
the interest-only term will outpace the outstanding principal, allowing the
borrower to easily refinance or sell at a profit.
68. See Blanche Evans, Dark Housing Data Clouds Have Silver Linings,
REALTY TIMEs, Aug. 16, 2006, http://realtytimes.com/rtapages/20060816silverlinings.htm (stating that "many who bought homes in recent years
purchased them sooner than they otherwise would have because of very low
interest rates and a great sense of urgency, given the fear of being priced out
forever or missing out on a great investment").
69. See supra note 61 and accompanying text for various examples.
70. See SCHMUDDE, supra note 5, at 64-65 (indicating that lending
standards were put in place to protect all parties from the risk of default).
71. Id.
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security, lenders started providing "low documentation" or "stated
income" loan products to certain prime borrowers. 3
Lenders originally developed these loans for prime credit
borrowers who have difficulty documenting their income due to the
nature of their employment or a particular family situation. 4
Traditionally, lenders required proof of monthly and yearly income
for the past two years through W-2 forms and tax returns."
However, because the government never required this
documentation, lenders shifted to a greater use of lower
documentation loans, especially in the subprime market."
Lower documentation loans range from low documentation77
to, most alarmingly, no documentation at all." For example,
"stated income" loans allow borrowers to write in their income, no
proof required.79 The borrower only needs to provide a signed IRS
Form 4506 that allows the lender to verify the borrower's income
history and source, that potentially allows the lender to verify the

72. Id. at 65-66.
73. See, e.g., Freddie Mac, Alternative Stated Income Mortgage,
http://www.freddiemac.con/sellfactsheets/altstatedlincome.htm [hereinafter
Freddie Mac 2] (last visited Jan. 30, 2008) (noting that its stated income
program is designed to eliminate "the need for the large amount of income
documentation and complexities inherent in self-employment").
74. Families commonly use stated income loans when one family member
has a subprime credit rating but another member's credit could qualify for a
prime loan. Stating the family's income as a whole, along with one person's
prime credit rating, allows the family to purchase a home on more favorable
loan terms.
75. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
76. See Lingling Wei, Stated-Income Loans Can Pose Risks, Dow JONES
NEWSWIRES, Aug. 20, 2006, available at http://boston.com/business
/articles/2006/08/20/statedincomeloanscanpose.risks/ (noting that "greater
competition and the desire to simplify and quicken the ... process has led
more lenders to extend stated-income loans to [subprime] borrowers"); see also
FDIC, supra note 61 (noting a minimum increase of 15% in stated income
loans since 2001).
77. A "low documentation" loan is very similar to a "stated income" loan,
except that the lender will at least attempt to verify loan qualification in the
former. Marilyn Kennedy Melia, More Keeping Their Pay Secret, CHI.
TRIBUNE, Dec. 11, 2005, at Real Estate. For example, if the borrower alleges
that she is an attorney, the lender may check for the appropriate license.
Likewise, if the borrower is a business owner, the lender may check with the
Secretary of State to confirm that the business is in good standing.
78. See id. (remarking that "on a no-doc loan, the borrower doesn't reveal
his profession, income or assets").
79. Due to the near total reliance on borrower honesty, stated income loans
have been dubbed the "liar's loan." See "Liar Loans" Contribute to Mortgage
Problems, NPR, Mar. 17, 2007, http://www.npr.orgttemplates/story/story.php?
storyId=8972571 (stating that the "liar loan" has allowed borrowers to take
out larger loans than they can afford); see also Melia, supra note 77
(recognizing the apparent confusion that "stated" income means the borrower
can state any number).
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borrower's income history but not amount.' While stated income
loans presented the risk of mortgage fraud, adverse effects were
expected to be minimal. After all, how many borrowers would go
through the trouble of obtaining financing for a home they could
not afford?8
The answer is that an increasing number of borrowers use
low documentation and stated income loans to purchase homes
they could not qualify for under traditional guidelines.8" Indeed,
as home prices continue to climb, so has the use of these types of
loans.'
C. Freedom of Choice? The Payment Option Loan
Perhaps no other instrument in lending demonstrates the
desire for Americans to own their own home than the payment
option loan. Under this type of loan, the borrower has the option
to pay her mortgage in the fashion she desires.'
Such options
usually include the fifteen-year amortizing payment, 85 the
conventional thirty-year amortizing payment,8 the interest-only

80. FreddieMac 2, supra note 73. An IRS Form 4506 authorizes the IRS to
release a person's tax returns to a third party. Henry Savage, What is the
Form 4506 and Why Do Lenders Want You to Sign It?, REALTY TIMES, Oct. 2,
2002, http://realtytimes.com/rtpages/20021002_form4506.htm.
Therefore, by
signing the 4506, the borrower supports his statement of income by
authorizing the loan originator to check his tax returns. However, the lender
is not required to actually check and compare each borrower's income versus
tax returns. See generally id. (positing that a signed 4506 serves little purpose
in stated income loans other than to increase the loans' value in the secondary
market).
81. See generally Wei, supra note 76 (quoting Countrywide Financial
Corporation, "we have not found a significant enough difference in
performance between fully documented loans and stated-income loans to cause
us concern").
82. See id. (disclosing a report that out of a sample of 100 stated-income
loans, almost 60% had stated incomes that were inflated by over 50%). One
example is a seventy year-old Illinois borrower with a monthly income of
$1400, including $800 from Social Security, who received a $149,000 stated
income loan with a monthly payment of $1029. Id. The mortgage broker, who
prepared the loan application, stated the borrower's monthly income as $7225.
Id.
83. See FDIC, supra note 61 (noting that stated income and other
nontraditional loan products are more popular in states with strong housing
appreciation).
84. See generally Hovanesian, supra note 25 (stating that lenders started
marketing payment option ARMs in 1981 to "well-heeled home buyers" who
desired maximum flexibility in making their payments).
85. See Hovanesian, supra note 25, for an example of a thirty-year
$500,000 payment option loan that will be applied in the following endnotes.
The fifteen-year fully amortizing option would cost $4601.03 per month. Id.
86. The fully amortizing thirty-year option would charge $3455.08 per
month. Id.
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payment,87 and a minimum monthly payment that fails to meet the
full interest burden on the loan.88 Payment option loans accounted
for approximately 12.3% of all mortgages written through the first
half of 2006.9
The fifteen and thirty-year options are considered traditional
variable rate loans" because they will amortize the loan on
schedule. The interest-only payment option refers to a particular
type of "teaser" loan. 9 Overall, the minimum payment option is
the most dangerous in the lending market.9 2 The -minimum
payment option allows the borrower to pay an amount less than
the interest due on the loan and still remain in good standing. 3
However, the lender will subsequently tack the unpaid interest
onto the principal balance and readjust the payment structure
once the balance increases by 10-15%. 4 The borrower also faces a
de facto prepayment penalty and must settle the deferred interest
payment before refinancing can take place. 95
The number of homeowners falling into this negative
amortization trap is staggering. Research studies estimate that
up to 80% of payment option mortgage holders only make the
minimum payment on their loans.9" This is a recipe for disaster
when the loan readjusts to reflect the added principal, forcing the
borrower to either pay an amount greater than she was capable of
paying during the unadjusted period or fall into default.

87, The interest-only option would cost $3073.26 per month. Id.
88. The minimum payment on this $500,000 property would be $1608.20
per month, with the remaining interest tacked onto the principal balance. Id.
89. Id.
90. Even these alleged "safe" options can create an extensive amount of
risk. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS, supra note 57, at 3-4 (discussing how
monthly payments may "go up a lot" depending on the market interest rate).
91. See supra Part III.A (analyzing "teaser loans").
92. See Hovanesian, supra note 25 (quoting housing economist George
McCarthy that an option ARM is "like the neutron bomb ...kill[ing] all the
people but leav[ing] the houses standing").
93. See id. (using an example where the minimum payment in year one is
less than 50% of the thirty-year fully amortizing payment).
94. Id. Following the same example used above, paying the minimum
amount would tack on $20,214.81 in interest to the principal balance after the
first year. Id. After approximately 2.5 years of making minimum payments,
the loan readjusts once the principal balance reaches 10% of the original loan
($50,000). Id. The monthly payment after reset immediately shifts to
$4107.86. Id.
95. Id. At a very minimum, the borrower would have to pay off the deferred
interest prior to paying off a loan. Id. However, most payment option loans
carry a substantial prepayment penalty.
See, e.g., id. (reporting one
borrower's plight in having to "pay more than $10,000 in prepayment
penalties to refinance out of the loan").
96. Id. (referencing Fitch Ratings).
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As prime borrowers left behind the conventional wisdom of
prior generations97 and became willing to assume more risk
through nontraditional loans, they opened themselves up to the
same harsh lending practices plaguing the subprime market.
However, these practices are distinguishable because instead of
using points or above market interest charges, lenders
aggressively sold low monthly payments and the American dream
to expose prime borrowers to the traditionally subprime risks of
default, equity stripping and loan flipping.
IV. PROPOSAL

A. New Problems,Dated Solutions
The ramifications of "selling the payments" are making their
way through the housing and lending markets." Borrowers are
unable to count on rapid home appreciation, forcing them to
refinance,' sell °9 or ultimately face foreclosure.'
In other words,
borrowers of all credit ratings are beginning to feel the pressures
of the predatory lending environment.
Evidence of gathering trepidation is not solely through
anecdotal borrower accounts.
Countrywide Home Loans, the
nation's largest mortgage originator, recently sent letters out to
"thousands of borrowers" who used the payment option
mortgage.0 2 The letter informs borrowers that, "this is an early
message to alert you that, based on your current payment trends

97. See generally Wright, supra note 3, at 242-60 (describing the
development of real estate finance regulation beginning with the New Deal).
98. See Martin Crutsinger, New Home PricesFall By the Largest Amount in
More Than 35 Years, AP WORLDSTREAM, Oct. 26, 2006 (identifying various
symptoms of the housing slowdown, including a previous boom powered by the
"lowest mortgage rates" in forty years that was followed by "the sharpest yearover-year decline" in home values since December 1970).
99. See Damon Darlin, Mortgage Lesson No. 1: Home is Not a Piggy Bank,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2006, at C1 (identifying the third quarter of 2006 as
having the highest refinancing rate in over fifteen years, and tying that to
borrowers "scrambling to get out of interest-only mortgages that will soon
reset at a higher interest rate").
100. See Walt Molony, Existing-Home Sales Holding at a Sustainable Pace,
Realtor.org, Sept. 25, 2006, available at http://www.realtor.org/pressroom/
news-releases/2006/ehs-augO6_existing-homesalesholding.html (noting that
"housing inventory levels rose. . . to 3.92 million existing homes available for
sale [at the end of August] ... the highest supply since April 1993").
101. See Press Release, RealtyTrac Inc., National Foreclosures Remain
Elevated in September (Oct. 11, 2006) (on file with RealtyTrac Staff), available
at http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagementlPressRelease.aspx?ItemID
=1240 (identifying 112,210 properties in foreclosure during September 2006, a
63% increase in one year).
102. Kenneth Harney, Interest-Only Loans May Start Cheap, 'Reset' Scary,
BALT. SUN, Aug. 18, 2006, at 1E.
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and potential future interest rate changes, the monthly payment
you will be required to pay may increase significantly."" 3 Lenders
argue that the nontraditional loans have been "reserved... for
borrowers with solid credit scores, large down payments and
excellent employment histories."1" Yet, John G. Walsh, a senior
official at the Comptroller of the Currency, still believes there is a
price of a
problem with "understand[ing] the basic bargain:" 1 [t]he
5
low payment now is a much higher payment later. 0
This basic premise is as misunderstood in the prime market,
as are the hidden fees and interest charges used by lenders in the
The belief that prime credit
subprime predatory market.
As stated by
borrowers are more sophisticated is a fiction."
William Emmons, a Senior Economist at the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis, "U.S. households do not consistently
demonstrate the basic skills of financial literacy." °7 Prior to the
aggressive marketing and use of nontraditional loans, the thirtymortgage
protected
these
financially
year
fixed-rate
unsophisticated borrowers from predatory loans"°8 and had
relatively few pitfalls for qualified borrowers.
Federally mandated disclosures included in the Truth in
Lending Act (hereinafter TILA),"
Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (hereinafter RESPA)," and the Home Ownership
and Equity Protection Act (hereinafter HOEPA)"' attempted to
quell predatory lending by making interest rates as transparent as
possible."' Congress intended these disclosures to be a significant

103. Id. One letter addressed a borrower with a $402,000 loan who was only
making minimum monthly payments of $1348.47. Id. The letter explained
that after reset, the borrower's monthly payment would increase to $2887.50.
Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. Walsh continues, "I think it goes without saying that someone, at
some point, should have explained this" to poorly informed borrowers. Id.
106. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (listing articles that focus on
predatory lending in the subprime market due to a perceived economic or
educational disadvantage).
107. William R. Emmons, Consumer-FinanceMyths and Other Obstacles to
FinancialLiteracy, 24 ST. LouIs U. PUB. L. REV. 335, 337 (2005). "To be sure,
some households are very savvy financially, but the overall picture is of a
mediocre level of financial literacy." Id.
108. The standards implemented to protect lenders also act to protect the
borrower from defaulting. SCHMUDDE, supra note 5, at 76. The terms of a
fixed-rate loan are relatively simple and the borrower knows the exact
payment amount over the life of the loan. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 6,
at 1284 (stating that prime market borrowers have easy-to-analyze loans, with
future income being the only possible impediment to making payments).
109. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693(c) (2000).
110. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (2000).
111. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1602(aa), 1639(a)-(b) (2000).
112. However, none of the three acts was completely successful in this
endeavor. TILA, which requires the disclosure of finance charges and annual
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barrier to predatory practices given borrowers' overwhelming
preference for fixed-rate terms. Unfortunately, the disclosures are
ineffective in the nontraditional loan market as borrowers who fall
victim to such loans repeatedly complain that they did not
understand the terms.1
Alan Greenspan openly wondered if borrowers would benefit
from assuming greater risk on their mortgages. 4 While this
contention may be accurate in some cases, and certainly sparked
debate among the financial press, one cannot safely assume a risk
without fully understanding the nature of that risk."5
By
concentrating on interest rates and payments, borrowers are not
fully informed of the traditional lending framework. Specifically,
few understand the basic formulas used for approval of the loan
terms involved."6
Thus, TILA, RESPA and HOEPA are
insufficient because their disclosures do not address how much a
borrower can actually afford when buying a house." 7
In order to avoid being taken advantage of, buyers must be
placed on a level playing field with lenders. Federal disclosures

percentage rates (APRs), has significant deficiencies in the number of back
door charges that are excluded, particularly closing costs and insurance
packing. Engel & McCoy, supra note 6, at 1306-07. Congress enacted RESPA
to remedy these deficiencies by forcing the lender to disclose a good faith
estimation of closing costs. Id. at 1269. Usually, however, the estimation of
closing costs bears no relation to the actual number due at the closing. Id.
HOEPA was designed to further increase transparency, but has been
ineffective because it is considerably easy to avoid. See id. at 1312 (stating
that "HOEPA has been so easy to evade that its practical effect has been
negligible").
113. See Hovanesian, supra note 25, at 76 (quoting a borrower who used a
payment option ARM to refinance and withdraw equity, "[wie didn't really
understand what was taking place"); see also, Aldo Svaldi, Option Arms: A
Ticking Bomb?, DENVER POST, Oct. 1, 2006, at K1 (quoting another borrower,
"negative amortization was never explained to me," and a vice president of a
Colorado mortgage brokerage, "who reads all the disclosures?").
114. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
115. A basic concept of tort law is that, in order to assume a risk, one must
have "actual and conscious knowledge of the particular risk." JOHN L.
DIAMOND, LAWRENCE C. LEVINE, & M. STUART MADDEN, UNDERSTANDING
TORTS § 15.04 (2d ed. 2000).
116. Examples of confusing loan terms may include "debt to income ratio,"
"loan to value ratio," and other traditional notions of affordability.
117. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 6, at 1305-09 (discussing the failures of
the three statutes). TILA, RESPA and HOEPA generally have been attacked
for the various loopholes available to sharp lenders trying to avoid
enforcement. See generally Peterson, supra note 34, at 57-61 (explaining how
lenders can manipulate the regulations to avoid serving their true purpose).
For example, TILA provides certain exceptions that allow lenders to exclude
many settlement costs, such as "finance charge fees for title examination,
abstract of title, title insurance, property survey, document preparation,
notary services, credit reports, appraisals, pest inspections, flood hazard
determinations, security interest filing, and non-filing insurance." Id. at 58.
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regarding financing fees, closing costs, and annual percentage
rates are simply not enough to make the borrower fully aware of
the risks he is assuming, especially when the loan contains exotic
terms.
Borrowers should focus more on the basic affordability of
the home, as determined by their income.
Several commentators attempted to tackle the problem of
informed purchasing.
Their solutions support some type of
counseling, either through a mandatory buyer representative"' or
a disinterested third party. Such remedies faced criticism over the
alleged inefficiency of the process, as well as the potential
procedural hurdles."' These remedies are focused on problems
such as financing issues, excessive fees, and unnecessarily high
interest rates. 2
This Comment's proposal differs in that its primary focus is
on borrower self-awareness.1 22 Placing the emphasis on interest
rates and closing fees, while important, diminishes the importance
of paying the principal. The borrower is sold on a particular
payment and its temporal affordability, rather than the soundness
of the financial transaction as a whole. In order for the borrower
to fully understand the transaction, lenders must include a point
of reference for which the borrower is intimately familiar: income.

118. The following seeks to explain why borrowers must be financially savvy
to identify and understand the terms on a variable interest rate loan. First,
the TILA disclosure only identifies the temporary interest rate. Depending on
the loan term, the interest rate can adjust anywhere from one month to ten
years after consummation of the loan. How much the interest rate adjusts
depends on a particular "index" that is tied to the one-year Treasury bill or the
London Interbank Offered Rate. Next, the lender typically adds a 1-2%
margin in order to arrive at the monthly adjusted rate. Other details of the
loan, including ongoing adjustment periods and the overall rate cap, are often
buried or minimized in their placement. See generally, BRIAN BUCKS & KAREN
PENCE, FED. RESERVE BD. OF GOVERNORS, Do HOMEOWNERS KNOW THEIR
HOUSE

VALUES

AND

MORTGAGE

TERMS?

19

(2006),

available at

http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006/200603/200603pap.pdf
(noting
that only 25% of those surveyed could identify what index their ARM was tied
to, 41% did not know the lifetime cap, and 44% did not know at least one of the
variables involved in calculating adjustment caps).
119. See Stark, supra note 6, at 140-45 (suggesting "mortgage counseling
intervention").
120. See Peterson, supra note 34, at 56-61 (identifying both the practical
difficulties of mortgage counseling as well as the procedural barriers).
121. See Stark, supra note 6, at 137-42 (stating that the counselor could
review the borrower's loan papers and finances, and that the counseling would
cover "high-cost home loans" as determined by the APR and closing costs).
122. Stark's proposal does not require the counselor to give advice on home
affordability because it would be overly time-consuming and invasive to the
borrower. Id. at 142. However, this can be accomplished by simply requiring
an income disclosure.
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B. New Disclosuresfor New Problems
Lenders thrived for generations on the notion that a borrower
should spend no more than 25-28% of her gross income on a
mortgage.'23
Staying within these percentages helps protect
lenders from most defaults outside of job loss. 14 To better inform
borrowers of this concept, lenders should be required to provide a
comparison disclosure of appropriate income based on a thirtyyear fixed-rate amortizing schedule when using nontraditional
financing.
For example, if the borrower is attempting to secure a
$300,000 mortgage, the lender should disclose that, under
traditional guidelines of affordability, the borrower's household
income should be no less than $100,000."' Borrowers would then
have an immediate baseline for making a sound financial decision
as to what kind of home they can afford.'26 The disclosure should
also focus the borrower's attention on the principal balance, as
opposed to the monthly payment." 7
A second step, perhaps more controversial, would be to
remove any doubt by clearly listing the borrower's yearly income
underneath the income disclosure."'
This would immediately
allow the borrower to weigh any risks she assumes in taking the
mortgage. While income disclosure may not sound particularly
controversial, it would necessitate an accurate depiction of the
borrower's income. Thus, lenders would have a duty to take
reasonable steps to verify the borrower's yearly earnings and could
not rely on the no-documentation program.

123. SCHMUDDE, supra note 5, at 65.
124. Id.
125. The rule of thumb is that the purchase price of a home should be
between 2.5 to three times of the buyer's annual gross income. See, e.g.,
Freddie Mac, How Much Can You Afford to Spend on a Home?,
http://www.freddiemac.comcorporate/buyown/english/preparingtright~for-you/
afford.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2008) (using a more conservative approach of
multiplying annual gross income by 2.5).
126. If a borrower knows that his household income is less than $100,000, he
would have notice directly in front of him that the mortgage is unaffordable by
traditional means.
127. Lenders vastly prefer to use the debt to monthly income ratio in order
to approve a borrower for a loan amount. SCHMUDDE, supra note 5, at 65.
However, relying on this formula alone allows the "gaming" of the monthly
mortgage payment through the use of teaser rates, interest-only loans and
payment option loans. See supra Part III.A. (analyzing lender abuse of loans).
128. This could be easily integrated into the TILA disclosure form. The form

would not only disclose the APR and total estimated costs of financing, but
also the borrower's household income and traditional affordability guidelines.
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V.

CONCLUSION

The thirty-year fixed-rate loan has been the foundation of the
American housing market following the Great Depression. 9
Modern borrowers should be free to choose nontraditional
financing, but they must be able to assess the risks of that
alternate path. A disclosure model based solely on financing rates
and closing costs fails to capture the nature of this risk, allowing
aggressive lenders to market exotic financing plans and qualify
borrowers to purchase homes based on artificially low monthly
payments. Naive borrowers, of both prime and subprime credit
ratings, are then exposed to predatory lending practices, including
equity stripping through
multiple refinancing and an increased
130
risk of borrower default.
Disclosing traditional lending standards places the borrower
in a more comparable negotiating position with the lender.
Moreover, this type of disclosure is equally efficient and easy to
understand.
Lenders should provide a simple statement
identifying the amount of the loan and the income needed to
qualify under traditional guidelines, followed by a statement of the
borrower's income. If the borrower chooses to take on exotic
financing and assume its risks, the borrower will at least do so
after being fully informed.

129. Wright, supra note 3, at 232.
130. See supra Part II.C.

